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In a seminal paper, Krishna [89] shows that the presence of a quota on the foreign
producer's sales has drastically different implications depending on the nature of the
strategic variable chosen by the firms. The intuition for her result is that a quota is
formally equivalent to the presence of a capacity constraint for the foreign producer. It is
therefore easily understood that their implications are different depending on whether
firms use quantities or prices as their strategic variables. It is indeed well-known that the
presence of capacity constraints may destroy the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in
price-setting models whereas such a problem does not arise in quantity-setting models.
Krishna [89] shows that the presence of Voluntary Export Restraints1 (VER)
tends to yield more collusive outcomes, thereby explaining why export restraints can be
voluntary. To this end, she develops a price setting model in which two firms sell
symmetrically differentiated products. Moreover, she is interested by the effects of a
quota set in the vicinity of the Free Trade Equilibrium (FTE hereafter), and in particular
slightly above this level.
The present paper studies a similar problem within the horizontal product
differentiation model of Hotelling [29]. As noted by Krishna [89], it offers a natural
application of her analysis (cf. page 260) and has also been used in the recent literature
on international trade (see for instance Schmitt [90], [96]). Indeed, the Hotelling model
neatly captures the idea that intra-industry trade occurs because of the variety in
consumers' tastes and products' characteristics while allowing for strategic interactions
between firms. We consider a game similar to that of Krishna [89] : a domestic and a
foreign producer compete in prices on the domestic market. The foreign producer is
facing a quota when price competition takes place. Products are imperfect substitutes and
we model product differentiation using the address- model of Hotelling [29]. This will
allow us to characterise explicitly Nash equilibrium in prices and therefore address the
question of the optimal level of the quota.
Our main findings are the following.
1 We use the terms "quota" and "export restraints" indifferently in order to capture the idea that there is a
bound to the quantity of the good that the foreign producer is allowed to export to the domestic market.3
i) Quotas in the vicinity of the FTE level tend to destroy the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium. In this respect our results mimic those of Krishna. However, we identify the
precise range of quota levels where this phenomenon occurs. The relationship between
this range and the degree of product differentiation is then studied.
ii) A pure strategy equilibrium with large prices still exist if the quota is very restrictive
and the consumers are very sensitive to product differentiation, thereby making products
relatively poor substitutes. This equilibrium illustrates the effect of quantitative
restrictions in the Hotelling model : the presence of a quota allows both firms to benefit
from a local monopolist structure.
iii) Contemplating the issue of Voluntary Export Restraints, we show that the foreign
producer would always choose a quota in the vicinity of Free Trade.
iv) For most values of the parameters, the domestic government would choose complete
protectionism in order to maximise domestic welfare. However, when the valuation of
the product by the consumers does not differ too much from costs levels, a domestic
monopolist would not cover the market in equilibrium. In this case, limited competition
through restrictive, but positive, quota is desirable because it allows for market coverage,
without leading to a too large profits diversion.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the implications of a quota in a
price-setting industry are briefly recalled. In section 3, we consider the effects of a quota
under horizontal differentiation whereas section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the
Welfare implications of the quota. Section 5 concludes.
([SRUW5HVWUDLQWVDQG3URGXFW
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The implications of an export restraint in models of price competition is probably
best understood by noting that export restraints are formally equivalent to the presence of
a capacity constraint on the foreign producer. Price competition in the presence of
capacity constraints has been extensively studied since the pioneering work of
Edgeworth [25], although most often in the context of homogeneous product. In the
present context, the problem amounts to consider a price game with product
differentiation, in which one of the two firms only is capacity constrained (see Levitan &
Shubik [72] for a similar analysis with homogeneous product).
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In order to capture the intuition underlying our analysis, consider two firms
selling substitute products and competing in prices in a differentiated industry. Let us
denote ( , ) ** pp 12 , the unique Nash equilibrium which prevails when firms do not face any
form of quantitative restriction. Suppose now that firm 2 is facing a quota at the FTE
level, i.e. q D p p ≡ 212 (,) ** . Is ( , ) ** pp 12  still an equilibrium ? Presumably not. Indeed, if
firm 1 raises p1, against p2
*, her demand should decrease whereas the demand addressed
to firm 2 should increase. However, firm 2 cannot meet this demand since it exceeds the
quota. Accordingly, rationing appears in the market. It is then sufficient that some
rationed consumers turn back to firm 1 in order to make the deviation profitable, thereby
destroying our equilibrium candidate. Now, the question is to find out the nature of the
new equilibrium.
As noted in the preceding argument, the presence of the quota typically implies
that the payoffs of the domestic producer are not quasi-concave, so that the existence of
an equilibrium can be problematic. Yet, contrarily to models of homogeneous goods,
payoffs are continuous under product differentiation, therefore it is only the existence of
an equilibrium in pure strategies which is problematic.
Summing up, we note that the presence of quantitative restrictions generates
incentives for the domestic producer to name high prices in order to create rationing at
the foreign firm and benefit from those rationed consumers who turn back to her. In other
words, the presence of the quota allows the domestic firm to act as a monopolist along a
residual demand. The level of this residual demand depends on the level of the quota and
the extent to which rationed consumers are willing to buy the domestic product instead of
refraining from consuming. Other things being equal, the larger the residual demand, the
greater the incentive to quote high prices. Therefore, the extent to which the domestic
producer recovers rationed consumers is of crucial importance for the analysis. Product
differentiation should play an important role in this respect. The other crucial element is
the form of the rationing rule which determines who are the rationed consumers (they
have unit demand for the products). Moreover, in the Hotelling model, each consumer is
characterised by a particular reservation price for each product, therefore the identity of
the rationed consumers is directly linked to their willingness to report their purchase to
the domestic firm in case of rationing.
In the present paper, we consider the efficient rationing rule so that rationed
consumers are characterised by the lowest reservation prices for the foreign product.
Although efficient rationing is not necessarily the most intuitive rationing rule, it has5
been widely used in the literature (see for instance Kreps & Scheinkman [83]).
Moreover, it easily compares with the implicit rationing rule considered by Krishna2.
3ULFH(TXLOLEULXPLQWKH3UHVHQFH
RID4XRWD
In order to capture horizontal differentiation, we consider the most simple version
of the Hotelling model with fixed locations (this point shall never change).
7KH)UHH7UDGHEHQFKPDUN
An indivisible homogeneous good is sold by a domestic firm at a price pd and by
a foreign firm at a price pf. They are respectively located at the left end and the right end
of the [0;1] segment. Consumers are uniformly distributed over this space of
characteristics and identified by their address x. A consumer buy at most one unit of the
good, bears a linear transportation cost and has a reservation price S for the good. Hence,
the utility derived by a consumer located at x in the interval [0,1] when buying the
domestic product is S − tx − pd while he gets S t x pf −−− () 1  if he buys from the foreign
producer. Refraining from consuming any of the two products yields a nil level of
utility3. Since we can normalise prices, we set the transportation cost t at 1$ ; thus, a
large S either means that consumers like the good very much or that the two firms are
poorly differentiated.
Although being a fairly standard result, we first characterise the Hotelling
equilibrium in full length. Indeed, this will provide a useful benchmark for the analysis to
follow.
2 We will discuss later on the robustness of our results to the introduction of other rationing rules.
3 In Hotelling's original model, this possibility is not considered, formally, this correspond to an infinite S.
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If S > 3/2 and firms face no quantitative constraints, the only Nash
equilibrium of the pricing game is (1,1) and the market is covered.
Proof  As one can see with the plain lines
of figure 1, if prices are not too large, all
agents buy the good at one of the shops :
agents living in the segment  0;˜(,) xp p df []
will buy at the domestic firm and the rest
buy at the foreign firm.
x
S − x − pd
01 ˜ x(pd,p f )
S − (1 − x) − pf
Utility
Figure 1
Since the consumers are uniformly distributed on [0;1], the demands are
respectively ˜(,) xp p df  and 1− ˜(,) xp p df . We compute ˜(,) xp p df  by solving S − tx − pd =
St x p f −−− () 1  and we get Di = 
1
2
−+ pp ij  for i = d,f. It is also clear that if prices are
too large the market is not covered (cf. dashed lines of figure 1) and the demand
addressed to firm i is S pi −  ; this happens if S x p p p p S p ij i i j −− < ⇔ > − − ˜(,) 0 2 1 .   In

































. The best reply of firm i will depend on the relative
ordering of H(pj), S/2 and 2 1 Sp j −−  ; we analyse this in the following table.




Ordering H(pj) < S/2 <
21 Sp j −−
S/2 < H(pj) <
21 Sp j −−
21 Sp j −−  < S/2 <
H(pj)
Best reply H(pj) H(pj) S/27
For pj < S  − 1, H(pj) is in the right domain while S/2 is not,thus, at 2 1 Sp j −− ,
both parabola are decreasing and pi = H(pj) is the overall maximiser of the profit
function. The case pS j
S ∈− − [] 11 3
2 ;  has an identical conclusion while for pj >  3
2
S − 1, it
is reversed.
Figure 2 displays the best reply
functions (note that  S > 32   ⇒  3
2
S − 1 > 1).
Since the demand Di(pi,pj) is linear in pj, the
profit function is concave so that the best
reply to a mixed strategy is the best reply to
its expectation which is a pure strategy.
Therefore, the unique Nash equilibrium of
this pricing game is pure ; as seen on the
figure, the best reply lines intersect at the unit









Note that the equilibrium prices do not depend on S and are "too low" in the sense
that all consumers enjoy a strictly positive surplus. Clearly, firms could benefit from the
presence of the quota to relax the price competition.
([SRUW5HVWUDLQWV
The analysis of the pricing game with the quota proceeds as follows. Against a
foreigner's price, the domestic producer contemplates two options : by naming a high
price, she will make the quota binding, thereby generating rationing and spillovers. By
naming a low price, she fights for market shares, exactly as under free trade. First, we
characterise the shape of demands, corresponding to these two strategic options for all
possible price constellations. Second, we compute the firms' best replies : the domestic
one is discontinuous, reflecting the two strategic options mentioned above whereas the
foreign one is kinked. With these best replies in hand, we characterise the Nash
equilibrium in prices for all possible constellations of q and S. These equilibria may
involve either pure or mixed strategies.
We will assume that the efficient rationing rule is at work in the market, as in
Kreps & Scheinkman [83] : rationed consumers are those exhibiting the lowest
reservation price for the rationed good. In other words, among the set of potential
8
consumers of the foreign product, they are the most inclined to turn to the domestic firm.
Consider the example depicted on Figure 3 below : some consumers willing to buy at the
foreign firm are rationed. Under efficient rationing, they are located in the interval
˜(,) ; xp p q df []  and thus are precisely the most inclined to switch to the domestic firm.
Despite the latter has a potentially low demand (pd is large relative to pf), the fact that the
foreign firm is constrained by the quota, could give the domestic firm an effective
demand of 1 − q.
x




for the foreign firm
67 48 4
Potential demand






switch from the foreign firm
to the domestic one
Figure 3
More precisely, as long as pd is less than S −(1− q) which measure the net utility
of the consumer located in q, the effective demand of the domestic firm is 1 − q. This
feature of the market allocation rule also lowers domestic firm's incentives to enter a
price competition "à la Bertrand" since her demand is locally independent of her own
price pd. Note thus that within our framework, efficient rationing defines the largest
residual demand for the domestic firm, so that, contrarily to Kreps & Scheinkman, the
incentives to use rationing strategically are maximised.
7KHTXRWDFRQVWUDLQHG(TXLOLEULXP
The formal derivation of the demand functions can be found in our paper
(Boccard & Wauthy [97b]) on capacity pre-commitment in the Hotelling model which is
more general on this point. Figure 4 below will help to understand how the quota affects
the game. Lets start from region A where the market is covered and the foreign firm is
not constrained by the quota.9
If pf increases, we leave area
A to get into area D as in the free
trade analysis as the marginal
consumer  ˜(,) xp p df  ceases to buy
the good. The complex part is when
pd increases because the domestic
firm expects to benefit from
spillovers. Indeed, in area B, the
domestic firm recovers all rationed
consumers while for larger prices






S − q 2S − 1
Dd = ˜ x(pd,pf )
Df =1− ˜ x(pd,pf )
Dd =1− q
Df = q
Dd = S− pd
Df = S− pf
Dd = S− pd
Df = q
Figure 4
 This is area C where the foreign producer is still constrained by the quota. The
equation of the frontier A/B is the solution of 1− () = ˜ , xp p q df  and gives
pp q df =+ − 1 2 , the equation of the frontier A/D is p S p df =− − 2 1 . We can now derive
the best reply functions by considering in turn the optimal responses in the four areas.
Intuitively, against a low pd, the foreign firm responds in an aggressive manner to
gain market shares. As pd increases,  her sales increases and finally reach the quota ; for
domestic prices above that threshold, the foreign producer can only sale the quota at a
maximum price (see the kinked bold line on figure 5 below). Analytically, the free trade












˜ ,() xp p
p
df d
d ψ , it reaches the
quota at  ˆ pq d ≡− 4 1. Against a larger domestic price, the foreign firm sticks to the quota.
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In areas B and C where the quota is
binding, the foreign demand is constant,
thus the optimal price is the largest
possible one which leads us to the frontiers
with Areas A and D. Note then that the
optimal price in B∪C is dominated by that
of A∪D. The only (technical) problem is












If, as displayed on figure 5, the monopolistic price S/2 is less than S − q, the
monopoly profit function is decreasing everywhere in D and the optimal choice is S − q.
The remaining possibility, S/2 > S − q is irrelevant4. In conclusion, the best reply of the
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We now turn to the domestic best reply. Area C∪D is straightforward to analyse
since there is no competition as the market is left uncovered. As the monopolistic price
S/2 is the overall maximiser of the profit, if it lies above S − 1 + q, then it is the dominant
strategy played by the domestic firm in equilibrium. This happens when q < 1 − S/2 i.e.,
S must be small and the quota very restrictive (less than 1/4 as S > 3/2). Otherwise, the
optimal price is S − 1 + q.
The crucial point that drives all our results is the behaviour of the domestic firm
in a competitive context i.e., area A∪B where the market is covered. She can act in a
classical fashion by fighting for market share with a low price or she can take advantage
of the quota with a high price in order to create some rationing at the foreign firm and
recover the rationed consumers. Intuitively, if the foreign firm is aggressive, the price
4 Indeed, q must be greater than 3/4 as S  > 3/2 ; in that case, the best reply of the domestic firm to S/2
would create competition i.e., we are driven back in area A. Thus, the foreigner monopoly strategy S/2
won't appear in equilibrium and this is why omit it.11
competition generated by the first option drives the profits to zero, it is therefore better to
hide behind the quota in order to be able to act as a monopolist on a residual demand.
However, if the foreign firm becomes less aggressive then it is optimal to revert to an
aggressive pricing. The optimal behaviour of the domestic firm can drastically change,
depending on her perception of the foreign firm pricing.
The first option corresponds to area A where the free trade analysis applies, the
optimal price is (1+pf)/2. The second option is area B where the demand is always 1 − q,
the largest price S − 1 + q is therefore optimal. The associated profits are respectively
() 1
8
2 + pf  and  S q q −+ [] − 11 ( ), they are equal at ˆ () pS q q f ≡− + [] −− 8 1 1 1. We obtain
the discontinuous best reply function of the domestic firm :
- if q < 1 − S/2, ψdf pS () / = 2
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The fact that the best reply function of the domestic firm is discontinuous at ˆ pf
can preclude the existence of pure strategy equilibria but contrarily to the case studied by
Kreps & Scheinkman [83] and Osborne & Pitchik [86], there is no density of prices in
equilibrium. This is a property of product differentiation.
12
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The unique equilibrium of the pricing game is as follows :
i) if q < 1 − S/2, the domestic firm acts as a pure monopolist and the foreign one
sell her quota at a maximum price, the market is uncovered.
ii) if 1 − S/2 < q < 1 − S/3, the domestic firm covers the market but do not enter a
price competition with the foreign firm.
iii) if 1 − S/3 < q <  T, an Edgeworth cycle appears where the domestic firm mixes
between aggressive pricing and hiding behind the quota while the foreign firm
plays a pure strategy.
iv) if q >  T,  firms play the Hotelling unit price.
Proof Observed from figure 3 above that, for any pd, Df(p d,.) is a weakly decreasing
function, so that the profit function Πf d p ( ,.) is concave for any pd. Thus, whatever
mixed strategy Fd the domestic firm might play, ΠΠ fd fd dd F p dF p ( ,.) ( ,.) ( ) ≡ ∫  is again
concave and has a unique maximiser which means that in a Nash equilibrium, the foreign
firm plays a pure strategy.
When the quota is very loose (case iv), the "classical" Hotelling equilibrium (1,1)
remains an equilibrium because the residual demand is too small. The analytical
conditions derived from the best reply functions are ˆ pf < 1 and 1 <  ˆ pd. From the first,
we get  Sq q q q
SS
−+ [] −< ⇒ > ≡ −
−−




( ) /  (one root is negative). From the
second, we obtain q > 1/2 which is satisfied by q as S > 3/2.
At the other extreme where q < 1 − S/2 (case i), the domestic firm plays the
dominant strategy S/2 and the best reply of the foreign firm is then S  − q ; those prices
form the unique Nash equilibrium which features an uncovered market because Dd = S/2
< 1 − q and Df = q. If the quota is only slightly larger (case ii), this kind of equilibrium
where firms do not compete, stills prevails. The only difference is that the domestic plays
pd = S  − 1 + q against S  − q and the market is exactly covered. This behaviour is
optimal for the domestic firm if S − q <  ˆ pf which leads to q < 1 − S/3.
When  qS q ∈− [] 13 / ;  (case iii), we have 1 <  ˆ pf < S − q as on figure 6 below















The curves do not intersect, hence there exists no pure strategy equilibrium. Still,
the foreign firm plays a pure strategy in equilibrium, it must be  ˆ pf because it is the only
one that enables the domestic firm to mix between S − 1 + q and 
1
2
+ˆ pf . The weight μ put
by the domestic firm on S − 1 + q is chosen to make  ˆ pf a best reply for the foreign firm
against that mixture. More precisely, the foreign profit against the mixed strategy Fd is
Πfdf f
p
f Fp p q x p


















= 0, we get the argmax as a function P(.) of μ, we then







The following comments are in order. Note first that by considering the complete
range of possible values of the quota, we give a precise content to the idea of a quota "in
the vicinity of the FTE" considered by Krishna [89]. More precisely, a mixed strategy
equilibrium is found to exist only for a range of intermediate values of the quota (case
iii). Second, it is easy to relate the size of this interval  13 − [] Sq / ; to S, the fundamental
parameter of the model.  As q increases with S, the larger S, the larger the interval which
supports a mixed strategy equilibrium. The reasons for this are quite intuitive : when S is
large, the profit levels at the Hotelling equilibrium are well below the monopoly profit
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levels5. Since the security strategy basically allows the domestic producer to reach her
monopoly profit curve, she has a  great incentive to do so.
A third observation is that a pure strategy equilibrium can exist under highly
restrictive quota levels (case ii). This possibility was not considered by Krishna [89] and
is indeed not relevant in her setting. This result is very specific to the Hotelling model
and relies on the idea of localised competition which is embodied into the Hotelling
framework : the quota weakens the incentives to compete in prices by allowing both
firms to play along their respective local monopolists' curves. Stated differently, a quota
under horizontal differentiation essentially allows both firms to benefit from their local
market advantages. In the limit, the domestic firm enjoys her full monopoly profits if
both q and S are low (case i).
4XRWDVDQG:HOIDUH
In this section we address two questions. First, to what extent could the quota be
voluntary ? Second, what is the optimal level of the quota from a domestic welfare
viewpoint ? The first question is prompted by the comparison of this model with that of
Krishna [89]. She concentrates on quota in the vicinity of the FTE. We will show that in
our model the foreign firm would indeed choose the level of the VER in this region in
order to maximise profits. Depending on the value of the parameters, this voluntary
export restraint will be chosen above or below the FTE level. On the other hand, a
government aiming at maximising domestic welfare will have to account of three factors
when choosing the level of the quota. First, there is the profit diversion effect, i.e. the
part of the total welfare which is captured by the foreign producer in the presence of the
quota. Second, total welfare is maximised when prices are equal. In this case indeed,
utility losses reflecting the fact that consumers are not able to buy their ideal product are
minimised. Therefore, domestic welfare will be lower when prices are not equal since the
marginal consumer will not be located in the middle of the market. Third, a quota affects
welfare negatively if it prevents full market coverage.
5 Either because the reservation price is large or because the transportation cost is low i.e., products are
poorly differentiated and the price competition is fierce.15
We concentrate first on the implications of the quota on the foreign producer's
payoffs. We summarise hereafter the payoffs of the firms in the four kind of equilibria.
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01 2 0 3 ; , , this means
that Πf is increasing with the quota over  01 3 ; − []
S . The formula of Πf over  1 3 − [[
S q ;
involves an intricate polynomial expression which cannot be studied analytically in q.
However, it can be shown that on this domain the function is smooth, so that we can rely
on numerical computations. These computations indicate that the foreign producer's
payoff is strictly concave in the domain of the mixed strategy equilibrium. Since profit is
constant over  q;1 [] , we may thus conclude that Πf reaches a maximum for a quota
interior to  1 3 − [[
S q ; . Moreover, a numerical maximisation indicate that this optimal quota
is slightly increasing in S and lie in the vicinity of Free Trade demand level (i.e., 1/2).
We summarise our findings in the following proposition.
3URSRVLWLRQ
The foreign producer would choose a VER in the vicinity of the FTE.
On figure 7, we provide a plot of the foreign profit surface in the (q,S) space ; the
various levels of grey correspond to the four different kind of pricing equilibria.
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Figure 7
This result of proposition 3 is intuitive. Choosing a VER in the vicinity of Free
Trade allows the foreign producer to take advantage of the price effect associated with
the quota without penalising her too much in terms of potential sales. Note however that
the profitability of the quota does not strictly depend on the equilibrium being in mixed
strategies. One can see on figure 7 that for some combinations of q and S, the pure
strategy equilibrium where the quota is binding (case ii) pays more than the free trade
one because the lower sales are more than compensated by higher prices.
We turn now to the domestic welfare issue. The domestic welfare Wd is obtained
from the total welfare by subtracting the foreign profit. In the Hotelling model, the total
welfare is easily derived because, as long as the market is covered, it does not depend on
the level of prices but only on the position of the marginal consumers (which depends in
turn on price differentials only). Total welfare is :
 (,) ( ) ( )
˜(,) ˜(,) ˜
˜
Wp p S xd x S xd x S













It is immediate to see that total welfare is maximised when ˜(,) xp p df  = 1/2 i.e.,
for identical prices. The quota will therefore affect domestic welfare in two obvious
ways. First is the impact of foreign profits and second is the impact of price differentials.
3URSRVLWLRQ
The domestic government would choose protectionism unless the domestic
firm does not cover the market by itself in which case the foreign firm is allowed to
sell the complement.
Proof  When the market is uncovered (case i), the domestic firm is a pure monopolist
and the foreign firm is constrained by the quota, thus we have :












 As Πf qS q =− ( ) on this domain, the domestic welfare is W
Sq
d




which is increasing in the quota. From this observation, we conclude that for low values
of S, the domestic government will not implement a full protectionism policy, he will
issue a quota that enables the foreign firm to serve the part of the market left uncovered
by the domestic firm (who act as a monopolist on this range of quotas).












. As Πf qS q =− ( ), we get
WqS S d
ii =− + − () 1
1
2
 which is decreasing with the quota. Hence, over  01 3 ; − [[
S , the
optimal quota is 1 2 − S which we call the "market-complement".




+ˆ pf  with probabilities μ and 1−μ, the foreign firm sticks to  ˆ pf. Total welfare is
thus the average formula WW Sq p Wp f
p
f
f iii =− + + −




2 . This function
cannot be studied analytically. However, it is smooth in the relevant domain and
numerical computations indicate that domestic welfare is strictly convex, therefore it
cannot be optimal for the government to set a quota in this region. Intuitively, this could
have been expected since foreign profits tends to be higher in this region so that profit
18
diversion affects domestic welfare negatively, moreover prices are not equal so that total
welfare must also be lower.
Lastly, when the Free Trade equilibrium prevails (case iv), total welfare is
maximum because the marginal consumer is in the middle of the market. Since neither
the foreign profit nor the total welfare depend on the quota, the domestic welfare is
constant on  q;1 []  and equal to S − 3/4.
To find the overall optimal quota for the government, we have to compare the free
trade solution (q = 1) to the "market-complement" one (q = 1 2 − S). When S > 2, this latter








 evaluated at q = 1 2 − S is greater than the free trade welfare S − 3/4, thus
it is optimal to let the foreign firm cover the part of the market not served by the
domestic monopolist. Note furthermore that this particular choice of quota is not
followed by price competition as case i or ii applies in the equilibrium of the game. ♦
Figure 8 provides a plot of the domestic welfare surface in the (q,S) space.
Figure 819
)LQDOUHPDUNV
In this note, we have studied by mean of an example the implication of Export
Restraints in an address-model of horizontal differentiation. Our findings are clearly
specific to the particular case we have studied, however several generalisations can be
considered. First, our results have been derived using an efficient rationing rule. In this
respect, it must be noted that this form of rationing is in fact the most favourable for the
domestic producer. In this sense, any other rationing rule would make deviations less
profitable, thereby reducing the domain in which the quota will lead to a mixed strategy
equilibrium. On the other hand, under other rationing rules, it could happen that some of
the rationed consumers do not consume at an equilibrium. This clearly has a negative
impact on Welfare.
Second, one could argue that the parameter constellations in which a pure strategy
equilibrium is compatible with a restrictive quota (cases i and ii) are not the most likely
to be observed as we must have S∈[[
3
2 3 ;  in order that the quota interval  01 3 ; − [[
S  is non
void. In this respect, it is important to recall that the analysis has been performed under
zero production cost. It is easy to see that under symmetric constant marginal cost c, the
relevant constellation is Sc −∈ [[
3
2 3 ; . Thus, the case for a restrictive quota depends in
fact on the difference between the valuation of the product on the consumers' side in the
domestic market and the production cost. Note also that the presence of a cost differential
would not affect qualitatively our results. If the domestic producer faces a cost
disadvantage, this reinforces the case for protectionism, other things being equal.
Clearly, assuming that products are located at both ends of the interval is
restrictive. This assumption has been made in order to preserve the tractability of the
problem. However, as long as efficient rationing prevails, the implications of inside
locations are easy to trace. The only possible effect is that the residual demand addressed
to the domestic producer becomes smaller. This would be the case if rationed consumers
are located close to the right end of the interval. Thus, the incentive to hide behind the
quota are weaker. An interesting extension of the present paper would consist in
endogeneizing the choice of products' characteristics in the presence of the quota.
However, this task is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper.
Note finally that our analysis has been confined to the case of horizontal
differentiation. In this respect, we have shown that the quota relaxes price competition by
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allowing firms to exploit the local monopoly structure which is inherent to the Hotelling
model. Therefore, one should not expect to observe the same kind of result in a vertical
differentiation model. In another paper (Boccard & Wauthy [97a]) we study this issue.
Relying on our findings in this paper and the present one, we are quite confident on the
fact that the effects of a quota dramatically depend on the nature of product
differentiation
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